opinions recognized that sex differentiation is largely cultural in origin, rather than based on "real" gender differences.
1o As a result, Justice Brennan created a truly independent gender jurisprudence, eventually emerging as the architect of the Supreme Court's contemporary test for evaluating claims of sex-based discrimination.
Understanding the significance of Brennan's contribution requires an appreciation of the Supreme Court's historical attitude towards sex-based discrimination. Before 1971, the Supreme Court unifonnly upheld governmental classifications based on stereotypical and traditional role differences between men and women. Laws routinely classified individuals by gender, treating men and women as occupying separate spheres. Men occupied the sphere of wage-eamer, family head and societal actor. Women were assigned the roles of childbearer and rearer, and homemaker. These roles were thought to be mandated by nature and biology. Since men and women perfonned different roles, they could not stand as equals under the law. 11 
Gender In Traditional Case Law
Bradwell v. lllinois 12 was the first case to raise a constitutional challenge to the different treatment of men and women. In that case, Myra Bradwell challenged the refusal of the State of lliinois to pennit her to practice law solely because she was a woman. 13 The United States Supreme Court held that the lliinois standard did not offend the Privileges and Immunities Cause of the Fourteenth Amendment 14 
(1957):
For Mr. Justice Brennan the law is a living reality concerned with human beings, rather than a series of judicial declarations embalmed in judicial opinions. His enthusiasm is contagious and his ability to deal with judges and lawyers is outstanding. While he is keenly conscious of the fact that we live in a constantly changing world, he is equally aware of the fact that human nature changes very little. He is, therefore, instinctively inclined to preserve the essentials of all that is good in the past and to adapt them to the needs of the times. l' Id. at 131.
14 Id. at 139.
be, woman's protector and defender .... The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."lS In Muller v. Oregon,16 the Court continued its deference to sex-based classifications. There, the statute at issue prohibited employing women in factories or laundries for more than ten hours per day.17 Three years earlier, in Lochner v. New York,IS the Court had invalidated a state "maximum hours" law for bakers, concluding that such a law was not a legitimate exercise of police power because it unnecessarily interfered with individual freedom of contract 19 Nevertheless. the hours limitation for women in Muller was found valid on familiar paternalistic grounds: That woman's physical structure and the perfonnance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. . .. Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained. even when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained. It is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and depends upon him.20 The Court continued to "protect" women from earning a livelihood on the same basis as men in Goesart v. Cleary.21 There, the Court upheld a Michigan statute prohibiting the licensing of women as bartenders unless the woman was the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed bar or tavem. 22 The Court did not even question the proposition that MiChigan could prohibit all women from worldng as bartenders. Rather, the Court focused its attention on whether Michigan could create an exception for the daughters and wives of male owners.23 In upholding the statute, the Court found a legitimate state interest in combatting moral and social problems, concluding that "the oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a bannaid's husband or father minimize hazards that confront a bannaid without such protecting oversight. ,,24
Significantly, as late as 1961 the Warren Court approved sex-based distinctions which focused on woman as "the center of home and family life. ,,2S In Hoyt v. Florida,26 the Court unanimously upheld a state law which rendered males eligible for jury duty unless they requested an exemption, but automatically granted women an exemption unless they volunteered?7 In upholding the validity of this female exemption, the Court emphasized the centrality of woman's role as wife and mother "despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life fonnerly considered to be reserved to men .... ,,28 Moreover, administrative convenience pennitted a broad exemption for all women rather than requiring a showing of actual family responsibility.29
Indeed, all sex-based discrimination cases decided before 1971 under the equal protection clause, were analyzed under the standard which the Supreme Court employs in reviewing purely economic classifications. Under this standard, the "rational relationship" test, the Court displays extreme deference to legislative judgments respecting sex roles and classifications. [here], then is a paradox: The equal protection of the laws is a "pledge of the protection of equal laws." But laws may classify. And "the very idea of classification is that of inequality." In tackling this paradox, the Court has neither abandoned the demand for equality nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has taken a middle course. It has resolved the contradictory demands of legislative specialization and constitutional generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification.
The essence of that doctrine can be stated with deceptive simplicity. The constitution does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. But it does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated. In 1971, the use of this traditional standard of review ended abruptly in the Court's decision in Reed v. Reed. 32 In Reed, the Court unanimously invalidated an Idaho statutory scheme which established a method for the selection of administrators of intestate estates, requiring "males ... be preferred to females" between persons "equally entitled" to administer the estate.
33
This starutory preference for men was considered mandatory, without regard to individual qualifications to serve as administrator. 34 The Reed Court ostensibly applied the traditional "rational relationship" test, inquiring whether the sex-based classification of the Idaho statute advanced a pennissible statutory objective.
3s Admittedly, the legislative scheme promoted the goal of administrative convenience, reducing the workload of probate courts by eliminating some contests for executor. 36 The critical question, however, was whether the mandatory preference for men advanced this legitimate state objective in a manner which did not offend the Equal Protection Clause.
37
The Court reasoned that giving ". . . a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth; and whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex. ,,38 (Emphasis added)
The Reed approach is a departure from the rational relationship test of Goesart or Hoyt. judicial caseload could not be accomplished by such impennissible, arbitrary means. The Idaho statute would not result in the selection of the most competent executors unless it were based on the assumption that women are inherently less capable than men in administering estates. The Court conCluded that such an assumption rendered the Idaho scheme arbitrary. For the first time, the Court demonstrated "some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor .... ,,39 It is against this historical background that Justice Brennan's significant contributions to the law of sex-based discrimination should be evaluated.
BRENNAN'S GENDER DECISIONS
Frontiero v. Richardson 40 was first in the series of sex-based discrimination opinions by Justice Brennan. Frontiero involved a challenge to a federal statute which provided that spouses of male members of the anned services were automatically considered "dependents" for purposes of obtaining increased allowances and benefits, while spouses of female members were required to demonstrate dependency on their wives for over half of their support 41 With only one dissenter, the Court concluded that this sex-based difference violated the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment 42
As author of the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan asserted that sex should be deemed a suspect classification requiring the highest standard of judicial review. 43 In examining the history and effect of discrimination against women, Justice Brennan found that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. ,,44 In effect, Brennan created an independent gender discrimination jurisprudence.
Next, Justice Brennan addressed the rationale of the Frontiero statutory scheme. The government offered administrative convenience as the sole justification for its discriminatory scheme: Congress might find it efficient to create a conclusive presumption of female dependence,4s while requiring actual proof of male dependence. However, when pressed, the government failed to prove actual economic savings. goal of administrative convenience could not justify sex-based classifications, which promoted "romantic paternalism" acting to "put women not on a pedestal, but in a cage. ,,47
The significance of Justice Brennan's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to have sex declared a suspect classification cannot be overestimated. The Supreme Court treats governmental classifications based on race and national origin as suspect. subjecting them to strict scrutiny. For the most part, strict scrutiny invalidates classifications while rational relationship almost always upholds the governmental scheme. Professor Gunther has noted that, as a practical matter, this strict standard of judicial review is "fatal in fact" to a classification. 48 Having failed to attract the necessary votes to declare sex a suspect classification, Justice Brennan modified his position in Craig v. Boren. 49 The Craig Court invalidated Oldahoma statutes prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 and females under 18. 50 The state argued that statistical surveys demonstrated a high correlation between sex and alcohol-related driving offenses in that 2% of males but only 18% of females aged 18-20 had such driving 47 Id. at 684. Justice Brennan specifically asserted that what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect categories as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perfonn or contribute to society. As a result, statutoI)' distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members. Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, struck down a Social Security Act provision which granted a widow survivors' benefits based on her deceased husband's earnings, while permitting a widower benefits only if he had received at least one-half of his support from his deceased wife. Significantly, Justice Brennan viewed this scheme as discriminatoI)' against covered wage-earning wornen who received less protection for their spouses than enjoyed by similarly situated men. arrests. Sl Unpersuaded by the statistical evidence, Justice Brennan concluded that Oklahoma had failed to prove that "sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving."s2 Consequently, the Oklahoma legislative scheme failed to satisfy an "intennediate scrutiny" test requiring that sex-based classifications "must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."s3
Justice Brennan expressed particular concern that "[t]he very social stereotypes that find reflection in age differential laws ... are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of these comparative statistics. Hence 'reckless' young men who drink and drive are transfonned into arrest statistics, whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously escorted home.",54 Significantly, Craig, while bending to the pragmatic need to abandon the Frontiero sex-as-suspectclassification standard, reflected Justice Brennan's conviction that sex differentiation is largely culturally created.
5s
Under the intennediate or "mid-level" scrutiny developed by Brennan in Craig v. Boren, the sex-based statutory classification must be substantially related to achieving an important governmental goal.
S6 Brennan created the following framework for analyzing equal protection challenges to statutes containing sex-based classifications: The classification can withstand constitutional challenge only if it is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. s7 Justice Brennan would apply this standard for classifications which discriminate against men as well as women. In meeting its burden, the government must demonstrate that a genderneutral statute would be less effective in achieving the important governmental goal.
S8
51 Jd. at 201. 
63 Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist exhibited great deference towards the state's justification for the statutory rape law: the prevention of teenage pregnancy. Rehnquist concluded that, since only females can become pregnant, men and women are not similarly situated "with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse.,,64 Since the threat of pregnancy sufficiently deterred young females, the legislature could create a deterrent for young men by imposing criminal penalties.
65
Justice Brennan, in dissent, found that California had presented no evidence to prove that the threat of pregnancy deterred young females.
66
Significantly, Brennan concluded that California's statutory rape law resulted from "outmoded sexual stereotypes" which view males as sexual aggressors.
67
Justice Brennan consistently views "protective" or "benign" sex-based classifications as discriminatory. exemption had been created in 1855 on the assumption that all widows had been fmancially dependent on their husbands, the majority accepted Florida's argument that the law was intended to alleviate past economic discrimination against women. 70 Justice Brennan dissented, finding no compelling governmental interest in the Florida legislative scheme.71 Justice Brennan felt that the difficulty with Kahn v. Shevin was that it relegated widows to a permanent, separate status, regardless of wealth or business experience. At the same time, it denied the state's "benevolence" to widowers who may be needy or unsophisticated. 72 As such, the Florida statutory scheme perpetuates historical sex-role stereotypes which ultimately disadvantage both men and women. 73 Justice Brennan's consistent attempt to invalidate most sex-based classifications is grounded in his view that such discrimination is a deeply-rooted, historicru phenomenon. For example, in Frontiero Brennan confronted the "long and unfortunate rustory of sex discrimination,,74 which remains "pervasive" in society as "discrimination against women in our educational institutions, in the job market. and perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.'t75 The result of this continuing discrimination is that all sex-based laws, even those which ostensibly benefit women, "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the proper place of women and their need for special protection. ,,76 The consequence of such "protection" is that the laws are predicated on inaccurate and inequitable assumptions about the roles played by men and women.
Justice Brennan dissented again in Schlesinger v. BaUard. 71 There, the Court faced a challenge to a Federal statute subjecting a male navy officer who twice failed to be selected for promotion to mandatory discharge regardless of the length of time he had been in active service. 78 Under a different statute, a female officer was subject to mandatory discharge only after thirteen years of active service without promotion. 79 In upholding the regulation, the Court found that, because female officers were not assigned to combat duty and thus had less opportunity for advancement than male officers, the two groups were not similarly situated. so As a result, the classification was seen as compensatory rather than dnscriminatory.81 The majority observed that the "longer period of tenure for women officers would, therefore, be consistent with the goal to provide women officers with 'fair and equitable career advancement programS.',,82 Justice Brennan argued that because gender classification was involved, the legislation must be examined under the strict scrutiny standard. 83 He also noted that the legislative history failed to demonstrate a compensatory purpose with regard to female officers. 84 On the contrary, in Brennan's view "the legislative history [was] replete with indications of a decision not to give women any special advantage. ,,85
Significantly, in Geduldig v. Aiello,86 Brennan dissented from the Court's application of the mere rational basis standard to the statutory exclusion of pregnancy benefits from California's disability insurance program.81 lncredibly, tlhe Geduldig majority insisted that the exclusion of pregnancy did not involve a gender-based classification, but rather a distinction between pregnant cnnd nonpregnant persons. ]By singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard for disability compensation. . .. Such dissimilar treatment of men orund women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination. In Robens v. United States Jaycees,96 Justice Brennan enjoyed a now-rare position writing for the Court rather than in dissent 91 Brennan faced a conflict between First Amendment individual liberties and anti-discrimination state laws. At issue was the membership scheme of the national Jaycees which limited regular membership to men. 98 Two Minnesota chapters began accepting women as regular members, arguing that the Minnesota Human Rights Act mandated this action. The national organization alleged its First Amendment rights of speech and association had been abridged. 99 Although Justice Brennan conceded that application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act would cause "incidental abridgment" lOO of protected speech, such de minimis restriction was necessary to achieve the state's legitimate purpose in attacking invidious gender discrimination. lOl 
Privacy and Personal Autonomy
Justice Brennan's views on privacy and personal autonomy were grounded in his belief that the Constitution is subject to "contemporary ratification." Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia concluded that the "liberty" protected by substantive due process extended only to the liberty to engage in activities which have been protected "traditionally" from societal or state contro1. 107 Since Michael H.'s parental interest as an "adulterous biological father" had not been protected by societal or constitutional tradition, Scalia found the California conclusive presumption constitutionally valid. lOS Justice Brennan, in dissent, found Scalia's interpretation so narrow as to destroy the doctrine of substantive due process. 109 Admittedly, the legal "tradition" of the nation contains statutes criminalizing both abortion and the distribution of contraceptive devices. As a result, Brennan found Scalia's approach to be so limiting as to provide no real limit. llo Brennan argued that societal tradition is not the necessary condition to defIDing liberty which is protected from state action. Although recognizing the relevance of tradition, Brennan argued that the tradition which delineates the parameters of "liberty" is general, not specific.
lll Therefore, the liberties protected by due process are embodied in the general tradition precedentially protected by the Supreme Court, including parenthood, contraception and reproduction.
1l2 Indeed, under Justice Brennan's view, the tradition protecting Michael H. 's liberty interest exists in the Supreme Court decisions which affirmed the right of unwed fathers to parent their children. 113 In effect, the California conclusive presumption violated this Supreme Court tradition. Brennan's dissent underscored his views that Roe v. Wade and its progeny guarantee the constitutional right to personal privacy, protecting women from governmental interference during the first trimester.
ll7 Specifically, Brennan concluded that "the state must refrain from wielding its enormous power and influence in a manner that burden the pregnant woman's freedom to choose whether to have an abortion. 118
Significantly, Justice Brennan is one of the first members of the Court to treat gender-related characteristics, such as pregnancy, in non-discriminatory terms. Justice Brennan's approach contributed in the most significant manner to the debate concerning the definition and desirability of equality between women and men. Justice Brennan rejected the concept that most sex-based differences are "real" and biologically detennined. , concurring in pertinent part). The "real" sex differences approach stresses gender distinctions which are "real" in the sense of being "natural" or "biological", such as pregnancy, menstruation orlaclation. The significant question to the "real" differences proponents is whether women and men are different in fact with respect to a specific legislative classification. See also, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion) (pregnancy as a "natural" deterrent to sexual intercourse for young women, but not young men). Classifications based on such "real" differences are often over-inclusive in that many members of each gender lack the reproductive characteristics defining their sex. For example, excluding all women from a particular workplace because of dangers to reproduction would be over-inclusive to the extent that some characterized by sex differentiation, gender segregation, and gender-based hierarchical structures in the home, in the workplace and in the legislature, even facially neutral laws are likely to have a disparate impact on either men or women. 120 For example, seemingly neutral rules such as seniority and tenure, in fact discriminate against women because mothers, rather than fathers, are likely to intenupt their working lives to parent. 121 
Privacy, "Real" Gender Differences and Pregnancy
Although explicit gender classifications involving pregnancy have been deemed constitutionally valid because only women can become pregnant, 122 the Court has exhibited substantial difficulty in dealing with pregnancy legislation. The fact that pregnancy is gender specific has raised doctrinal problems and inconsistencies in the decisional law. Indeed, the Court has exhibited considerable reluctance to treat pregnancy classifications as sex-based discrimination. Significantly, the Court has had considerable difficulty in even perceiving disparate treatment issues in pregnancy classifications.
In Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur,123 the Court considered two mandatory maternity leave policies which excluded pregnant teachers from the classroom even though the teachers were willing and able to teach.l24 The circuit courts of appeals had treated the problem as one of equal protection. 125 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court chose to strike down the policies on due process grounds: the policies constituted impennissible irrebuttable presumptions about the pregnant woman's capacity to work, unduly burdening her fundamental right to bear a child.
126
As previously discussed, the Court did apply equal protection analysis to women are infertile. 121 The California disability insurance scheme covered numerous conditions, some expensive or voluntary, which applied to both sexes. The scheme also covered some health conditions unique to men, such as circumcision and prostatitis, while excluding nonnal pregnancy and childbi rth. 128 The majority applied the minimum rationality standard, holding that the equal protection clause did not mandate the "sacrifice" of California's disability system.
129
Justice Brennan dissented. 130 Unlike the majority, Brennan recognized that pregnancy-related disabilities are truly gender-linked disabilities since they result from physical characteristics inextricably possessed by women.
131 Justice Brennan accurately concluded that treating pregnancy disabilities differently than male sex-linked disabilities such as prostatitis constituted sex discrimination.
132
The Court continued its incredible and unworkable approach to pregnancy in the Title VII case, General Electric v. Gilben.133 Despite the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's promulgation of guidelines construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Ad 34 to mandate pregnancy coverage,13S the Court denied relief to women whose company disability policy extended benefits for nonoccupational health problems, while excluding pregnancy.136 Again, the majority distinguished between pregnant and unpregnant persons, stressing the fact that pregnancy is "often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.,,131 Naturally, Justice Brennan dissented.138 Brennan rejected the majority's insistence that pregnancy is a "gender-free" classification. 139 Significantly, Brennan argued that the majority's analysis "proves to be simplistic and misleading" . 140 Emphasizing the fact that all other sex-specific disabilities were covered by the plan, Justice Brennan concluded that excluding pregnancy disadvantaged women in the workplace. 141 The General Electric plan, therefore, discriminated against women by encouraging outmoded stereotypes of women in the workplace.
142
As such, Justice Brennan recognized that historical and societal attitudes towards women and pregnancy, rather than "real" gender differences created legal disabilities for women.
143
Brennan's analysis promotes gender equality by recognizing that the injury of sex discrimination rests in being deprived of political, legal, or educational opportunity merely because one is a woman or a man. l44 The genius of Justice Brennan's gender jurisprudence as it related to pregnancy is that he demanded the law abandon negative stereotypes in favor of equal treatment for women and men.
"Benign" Gender Discrimination
Justice Brennan generally opposed sex-based classifications which had the "benign" purpose of "compensat[ing] female beneficiaries as a group for the economic difficulties which still confront women who seek to support themselves and their families. ,,145 As previously discussed, Justice Brennan routinely (Vol. 25:2 rejected remedial measures grounded in the "romantic patemalism"l46 which actually perpetuates traditional sex roles. Brennan feared that even those genderbased classifications which government considered "an affinnative step toward alleviating the effects of past economic discrimination against women,,147 ultimately promoted the very gender stereotypes which foster gender inequality.148
As previously discussed, Kahn v. Shevin,149 is an example of "benign" or remedial legislation endorsed by the Court, but condemned by Justice Brennan. lSO In Kahn, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, upheld an 1885
Florida statute granting all widows a limited property tax exemption. lSI Although the 1855 enactment date belies the legislative intent of "alleviating the effects of past economic discrimination against women", Justice Douglas explicitly adopted Florida's rationale. Justice Douglas reasoned that "[w]hether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-dominated culture, the job marlc.et is inhospitable to the women seeking any but the lowest paid jobs. ,,152 Citing data demonstrating that the median income of working women was less than sixty percent of the male median, Justice Douglas concluded that:
The disparity is likely to be exacerbated for the widow. While the widower can usually continue in the occupation which preceded his spouse's death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which, because of her fOImer economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to offer. lS3 Although Justice Douglas' sensitivity to the peIVasiveness of economic discrimination against women is commendable, it fails to justify the establishment of a permanent, separate legal classification for all widows, regardless of their actual wealth, business experience, or gender victimization Indeed, the legislative classification in Kahn promotes the outmoded stereotypes of women which create and perpetuate worlcplace inequality. Essentially, Justice Douglas undermines his own sensitivity to gender discrimination by justifying the continued use of discriminatory sex-based classifications to remedy past inequities.
Justice Brennan understood this paradox. He insisted that legislative classifications (such as the one in Kahn) adversely affecting men should be subjected to the same scrutiny as sex-based laws discriminating against women. Significantly, Justice Brennan opposed most sex-based classifications as endorsing sex discrimination which is both constitutionally and morally problematic. Although Justice Brennan acknowledged the nation's "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,lS4 his gender jurisprudence explicitly rejected "benign" laws which burdened men in the name of remedying discrimination against women. Implicitly, Justice Brennan recognized that such "benign" legislative schemes actually embrace the outmoded stereotypes which relegate women to a different, unequal sphere. Ultimately, such remedial or benign classifications place women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.
As a result, Brennan's gender jurisprudence contributes significantly to the essential debate concerning the meaning of gender eqUality. Rejecting the unreflective biologic determinism permeating most sex-based classifications, Brennan sought to replace them with gender-neutral alternatives. Accordingly, Justice Brennan drafted the plurality opinion in Califano v. Gold/arb. iSS There, the Court invalidated a Social Security provision providing sUIVivor benefits to widowers only on a showing of substantial reliance on the deceased wife's income, while paying benefits to all widows, regardless of economic dependence. 1S6 The dissenters, led by Justice Rehnquist, were troubled by the fact that male litigants were able to invalidate legislation on the basis of sex-based discrimination without demonstrating that men are historically, economically, or politically disadvantaged.
1S7 Indeed, most of the benign discrimination cases brought to date have been instituted by males seeking "advantaged" treatment as 154 , J., dissenting) . Justice Rehnquist has argued consistently that men are not historical victims of economic or political discrimination. Therefore, men, unlike women, are not "in need of the special solicitude of the courts." Michael M., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
women. ISS These men did not want preferential treatment to be terminated-rather, they wanted the preferential treatment extended to themselves. In this respect there is no analog between "benign" or remedial racial legislation and remedial gender legislation. In racial discrimination legislation, the minority group seeks only one goal: attainment of the status accorded for white males. On the other hand, gender discrimination litigation follows two themes: 159 women seek to be treated like men in the workplace l60 and men seek to be treated like women in the area of personal or family life. 161 
CONCLUSION
It is virtually impossible to overestimate Justice Brennan's impact on the Supreme Court's gender jurisprudence. Although Brennan was unable to forge a majority to treat sex as a suspect classification, his attempts to create such an analytical framework helped the Coun emerge from decades of paternalism and discrimination.
Justice Brennan once stated:
[T]he ultimate question must be, what do the works of the text mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. 162 Justice Brennan deserves great credit for crafting a unique, far-reaching gender jurisprudence. His greatness is not only that he was creative and courageous, but that he urged both the Court and society to be creative and courageous, as well. To all familiar with his gender jurisprudence, Justice Brennan shall be remembered as one of the most innovative protectors of equal treatment before the law. 
